Which humans behave adaptively, and why does it matter? by Turke, Paul W.
Which Humans Behave Adaptively, 
And Why Does It Matter? 
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There has long been debate about the relevance of evolutionary theory to the study of 
humans. To many of us, however, the debate has shifted from whether to proceed with 
an evolutionary approach to how to proceed. Increasingly, it has been argued that 
studies of the current reproductive function of human traits make little or no contri- 
bution to the understanding of the psyche (e.g., Symons 1989). Here, on the basis of 
arguments about the relationship between an adaptation and an adaptive outcome, and 
a review of studies that assess current adaptiveness, I argue to the contrary that knowl- 
edge of the contexts in which people do or do not behave adaptively provides important 
information about the nature of the mechanisms that comprise the human psyche. In 
particular, studies that indicate that people behave adaptively in at least some contem- 
porary environments cast doubt on many nonevolutionary constructions of human na- 
ture, and can be used now to distinguish alternative evolutionary constructions that 
are at odds over many issues pentaining to the human psyche’s ontogeny and evolu- 
tionary background, especially the extent to which the human psyche is general purpose. 
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ince the dawn of the 1970’s, Richard Alexander, Napoleon Chagnon, 
William Irons, and a handful of others have made life uncomfortable 
for a great many social scientists. There was a time at the University 
of Michigan when graduate students in cultural anthropology took 
pains not to be seen in the company of Alexander, lest they risk raising the 
ire of their faculty advisors. Thankfully, this has begun to change; a few 
cultural anthropologists have even become regular contributors to Michi- 
gan’s Evolution and Human Behavior Program. 
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Has the discomfort and ire Alexander et al. have caused been the result 
of their advocating an invalid approach? Or is it that their approach has 
effectively challenged a number of cherished social science dogmas? Donald 
Symons and others have recently presented arguments-criticisms of the 
approach advocated by Alexander, Chagnon, and Irons-which, if correct, 
would force us to answer the first question affirmatively. I vigorously dis- 
agree with most of these criticisms, although acknowledging that there is 
much that is useful in the research strategies advocated by so-called evo- 
lutionary (or Darwinian) psychologists.’ 
The overriding theme of this paper is that knowledge of the contexts in 
which people do or do not behave adaptively provides important information 
about the nature of the mechanisms that comprise the human psyche. In 
turn, it is argued that recent articles deploring attempts to assess current 
adaptiveness are, ironically, counterproductive to the goal of illuminating 
mechanisms of the psyche.* Along the way, I discuss the relationship be- 
tween an adaptation and an adaptive outcome; dispute the argument that 
the environments to which humans are and are not adapted are captured by 
the Pleistocene/post-Pleistocene dichotomy; review and develop arguments 
suggesting that some mechanisms of the human psyche are more “general 
purpose” than implied in recent articles; and summarize evidence that sug- 
gests that humans in many different contemporary environments are be- 
having adaptively. 
In many respects, the arguments in this paper parallel those of Alex- 
ander (1990), Betzig (1989), Irons (1983), Sherman (1988), and Smuts (1990). 
Here, however, the emphasis is on determining 1) which people behave 
adaptively and 2) the extent to which studies of current adaptiveness help 
in the derivation and testing of alternative hypotheses about the nature of 
the human psyche. 
DEFINITIONS 
Adaptation To most evolutionary biologists, an “adaptation” is an aspect 
of a phenotype that was designed by natural selection to serve a function 
(e.g., Williams 1966; Mayr 1983). As such, all adaptations, including fac- 
’ As Alexander (1990) and Betzig (1989) note, an evolutionarily based focus on proximate mech- 
anisms is well entrenched in biology (e.g., Holmes and Sherman 1982). Ironically, however, 
although evolutionary psychologists have recently published a large number of articles pro- 
claiming the virtues of this approach, there are few examples of them actually practicing it. 
Exceptions include Thomhill and Thornhill (1983), and Cosmides (1985), Buss 1989, and Daly 
and Wilson (1988). 
2 I note that the two psychologists who have contributed most to an evolutionary psychological 
approach have avoided this error: “[Elvidence that human fertility has been negatively asso- 
ciated with material success in certain societies during certain time periods . should provide 
some valuable clues for anyone wishing to develop a Darwinian psychology of fertility deci- 
sions” (Martin Daly and Margo Wilson 1986, p. 189). I would only add: ditto for evidence of 
a positive association. 
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ultative adaptations, are products of gene-environment interaction, which 
means that it is invalid to carve the phenotype into so-called “genetic ad- 
aptations” and “nongenetic adaptations.” The tendency to think of mor- 
phological traits, such as eye color, as solely determined by genes, and 
learned traits, such as human foraging techniques, as solely determined by 
the environment indicates a poor understanding of development and the 
r&on d’etre of phenotypes (Alexander 1979, pp. 87-98; Irons 1979a; Flinn 
and Alexander 1982; Turke 1984).3 
The fact that adaptations are products of gene-environment interaction 
bears on the assertion, with which I disagree, that “Natural selection cannot 
select for behavior per se; it can only select for mechanisms that produce 
behavior” (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, p. 281; Staddon 1987, p. 180; Symons 
1989). This assertion, I think, is intended to convince the reader that mech- 
anisms comprising behaviors are adaptations, behaviors themselves are not, 
and therefore only the former are the proper focus of adaptationist studies. 
However, to the contrary, morphology, physiology, psychology, and be- 
havior are, fundamentally, inseparable aspects of gene-environment inter- 
action. It follows that behaviors can be adaptations every bit as much as 
the morphological, physiological, and psychological mechanisms comprising 
behaviors.4 
Thus, there are three principal components which, when linked, rep- 
resent the process of adaptive evolution: there are genes-the entities which 
are actually accumulated by selection; there are the products of gene-en- 
vironment interaction, of which some qualify as adaptations; and there is 
selection, which is simply differential reproductive success. Of course, ran- 
dom forces also play a role in evolution, but they do not produce sustained 
directional change, and therefore cannot principally guide adaptive evolution 
(e.g., Dawkins 1986). 
In noting that an adaptation is the (naturally selected) continuum of 
development that results from gene-environment interaction, one brings at- 
tention to the fact that the function of any adaptation can be confounded- 
at any point in the continuum of proximate-to-ultimate function-by a sig- 
nificant change in the environment. Thus, just as reproductive outcomes can 
be confounded by environmental novelty (as is emphasized by those who 
criticize the study of reproductive outcomes [e.g., Cosmides and Tooby 
1987; Symons 1987a; 1989]), the development of other mechanisms, includ- 
ing psychological mechanisms, can be confounded by novel environments 
3 It is of course legitimate to ascribe phenotypic variance to genes, the environment, or some 
combination thereof, e.g., a particular individual’s skin may be more tanned than mine because 
he has recently spent more time in the sun, because of genetic differences, or because of some 
combination of genetic and environmental factors. Note also that finding that a phenotypic 
difference (e.g., in the suntans of two caucasions) is due solely to environmental factors (e.g., 
exposure to the sun) does not imply that the expression of such variation can not be an ad- 
aptation. 
4 Morphology, physiology, and behavior are aspects of what is simultaneously an entity and a 
phenomenon, much as light is simultaneously a particle and a wave. 
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(Betzig 1989, pp. 320-l). This point provides a basis for refuting the charge 
that it is evolutionarily “sophisticated” to predict the proximate workings 
of psychological mechanisms, but evolutionarily “naive” to predict repro- 
ductive outcomes (see later). 
Adaptive By the above definition, an aspect of a phenotype may qualify as 
an adaptation regardless of whether it currently produces an adaptive or 
maladaptive outcome-all that is necessary is that a history of selection 
designed the “trait” to serve a function. Whether that function is currently 
being served does not matter (see Ruse 1989). In contrast, the term “adap- 
tive” refers strictly to relative (i.e., better versus worse) outcomes. Ulti- 
mately, outcomes are judged better or worse according to their effects on 
gene frequency. Of course, only differences in outcomes that are due to 
differences in design can direct the evolution of adaptations (Williams 1966, 
p. 158). Because “inclusive fitness” theory (Hamilton 1964) provides the 
most widely accepted basis for keeping track of changes in the frequency 
of genes underlying adaptations (e.g., Trivers 1985; Williams 1985), an out- 
come generally is considered adaptive if, relative to other outcomes, it has 
a more positive effect on inclusive fitness. (In Hamilton’s original papers 
on inclusive fitness, an allele is selected for or against not because of its 
absolute effect but because of its effect relative to effects of alternative 
alleles.) Thus, adaptiveness is assessed by comparison, and depending on 
the specific comparison, a trait either is adaptive or it is not. Accordingly, 
hypotheses predicting adaptive outcomes are hypotheses that predict that 
individuals make choices that, given the particular alternatives, maximize 
their inclusive fitness. 
It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the fact that adap- 
tiveness is a relative concept-i.e., something that can be assessed only in 
comparison to something else. Thus, for example, when Alexander (1974; 
1979) hypothesized that it sometimes is adaptive for men to invest primarily 
in the offspring of their sisters (under conditions which prevail in about 25 
percent of the world’s societies), he meant that avuncular investment some- 
times can contribute more to a man’s inclusive fitness than the more typical 
arrangement in which parental investment goes primarily to the offspring of 
a man’s mate(s). Alexander’s hypothesis does not propose that the avun- 
culate is the best strategy in the best of all imaginable worlds. Furthermore, 
it may or may not be appropriate to expand his hypothesis by proposing 
that the avunculate is adaptive relative to still other particular courses of 
action (e.g., taking steps to increase paternity certainty). If Alexander’s 
hypothesis were to be expanded to address a wider array of alternatives, it 
would require additional tests (see Gaulin and Schlagel 1980; Flinn 1981), 
which eventually might allow us to conclude with some confidence that under 
particular conditions the avunculate maximizes inclusive fitness, relative to 
all feasible alternative strategies. Thus, it is the process of operationalizing 
and eventually testing an imagined alternative that converts it into a feasible 
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alternative. At present, however, Alexander is only justified in concluding, 
as he does, that Sahlins (1976) and others are wrong to assert that the avun- 
culate, by its very existence in a large number of societies, precludes the 
possibility that human kinship can be understood as systems for maximizing 
inclusive fitness (see Alexander 1988). Moreover, and particularly germane 
to this paper, refutation of Sahlins’ assertion is a first step toward refuting 
his widely shared assumptions about the nature of the human psyche. An 
understanding of the psyche, not of the avunculate per se, is what the “fuss” 
(Symons 1987a) is about. I will have more to say in the final section of this 
paper about the importance of studies which challenge nonadaptationist con- 
structions (iniplicit or explicit) of the human psyche.5 
The foregoing discussion makes the point that hypothesizing that a par- 
ticular trait yields an adaptive outcome does not imply the belief that the 
trait is the best of all imaginable alternatives. There are many reasons not 
to expect perfect adaptation, including factors such as pleiotropy, limited 
genetic variability, phylogenetic inertia, sampling error, and so on. Thus, 
notwithstanding the impression that some authors try to convey (e.g., Gould 
and Lewontin 1979), even the most ardent adaptationists recognize that, in 
some absolute sense, all organisms fail to maximize inclusive fitness (see 
Alexander 1987, p. 17). Of course, that organisms fail to maximize inclusive 
fitness in some absolute sense does not mean that particular behaviors are 
not adaptive (i.e., inclusive fitness maximizing) in the relativistic sense in 
which evolutionary biologists usually use the phrase. Thus, acknowledge- 
ment of constraints on perfection does not render the adaptationist approach 
impotent. 
Ironically, while critics such as Gould and Lewontin insist that con- 
straints on perfection should make us doubt the efficacy of generating hy- 
potheses which predict adaptive behavior (especially when the hypotheses 
pertain to humans), others have tried to lead us to a similar conclusion by 
arguing that behavior almost always is “somewhat adaptive,” in the sense 
that behavior almost always falls short of resulting in suicide and the death 
of all of one’s relatives-the “absolute zero” of adaptiveness. This seems 
to be Symons’ (1989, pp. 140-141) purpose in drawing attention to the ob- 
vious fact that “human action is not random with respect to reproduction.” 
His statement implies that studies which claim to support the prediction that 
a particular behavior is adaptive really only succeed at demonstrating the 
obvious-that there is a strong bias against acting in ways that approach 
the absolute zero of adaptiveness. I believe, however, that this type of po- 
tential confound-confusing what in an absolute sense is somewhat adaptive 
behavior for inclusive fitness maximizing behavior (in the sense of Hamilton, 
5 I do not mean to imply that the avunculate per se, is unimportant, nor do I mean to imply 
that understanding it has not been the primary goal of much research. Nevertheless, Sahlins’ 
(1976) book, as well as many other works like it, are as emotionally charged as they are because 
hypotheses like Alexander’s require a human nature that is at odds with the view of human 
nature that is implicit in many social science writings. 
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1964)-is primarily a problem for those individuals who, like Symons (1987b; 
1989) and Kitcher (1985), advocate an approach for assessing adaptiveness 
that requires the comparison of actual behavior with an imagined ideal (see 
later). 
In short, whereas some critics question the efficacy of approaches that 
predict adaptive outcomes by claiming that adaptive behavior is impossible, 
others do so by claiming that we find adaptive behavior everywhere we look 
for it. I have argued that both criticisms fail to appreciate that traits are 
adaptive or maladaptive only in comparison to specific alternatives. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN ADAPTATION AND 
AN ADAPTIVE OUTCOME 
Biologists generally have recognized that all complex aspects of phenotypes 
are potentially adaptations (Trivers 1985). This is because phenotypic com- 
plexity is not likely to be principally shaped by any evolutionary force other 
than natural selection (e.g., Dawkins 1986). However, because some com- 
plex aspects of phenotypes prove to be epiphenomenal (Williams 1966), that 
is, analogous to the Spandrels of San Marco (Gould and Lewontin 1979), 
complexity alone cannot establish that a particular aspect of a phenotype is 
an adaptation. As indicated in the above definition, it is also necessary to 
identify evolved function (Williams 1966). An adaptation’s evolved function 
can be identified and understood at many levels (chemical, physiological, 
psychological, economic/ergonomic, etc.), but, as noted, the ultimate func- 
tion of an adaptation is gene propagation, usually via inclusive fitness max- 
imization. One implication is that proximate function is always constrained 
by ultimate function (Dunbar 1982). An example that apprarently applies to 
all organisms is that, were it not for the necessity of reproducing, design for 
survival could be improved on (see Williams 1957; Hamilton 1966). It follows 
that an understanding of ultimate function informs an understanding of at 
least some proximate characteristics of adaptations (Alexander 1990 [this 
issue]; Betzig 1989). In particular, it is argued throughout much of the re- 
mainder of this paper that finding that an adaptation produces an adaptive 
outcome in particular environments, but not in others, often illuminates the 
trait’s selective background and ontogeny, including the extent to which a 
trait is general-purpose, and the range of conditions under which such gen- 
eral-purposeness produces adaptive outcomes. 
Problems associated with identifying adaptations. In nonhuman organisms, 
doubt about a trait’s status as an adaptation sometimes can be obviated by 
demonstrating that the trait in question is complex, persistent, and serves 
a proximate function (e.g., see discussion about the status of lateral lines of 
fishes [Williams 1966, pp. 10-I 11). Such evidence is often convincing, even 
in the absence of data directly demonstrating reproductive significance, be- 
cause plausible, nonindividual-selectionist alternatives that can account for 
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the evolution of complex, functional nonhuman traits are rare. For example, 
no one would insist that the lateral lines of fishes have an independent cul- 
tural origin. Nonetheless, even for nonhuman organisms, it sometimes is 
useful to go beyond the identification of proximate function. 
Consider dominance hierarchies: less than twenty years ago, Kummer 
(1971, p. 59) stated, in reference to baboons, that “dominant animals will 
take the food while the inferior ones will suffer from the shortage . . . [which] 
seems to be adaptive, because the experienced and reproductively active 
adult is more valuable to the group than an easily replaceable youngster.” 
Why would few primatologists make such a statement today? One reason 
is the wider dissemination of the theoretical arguments advanced by Williams 
(1966). Another is that study after study in species after species indicate that 
dominant animals use their proximate advantages in ways that have a pos- 
itive effect on one or more of the components of inclusive fitness.6 Similarly, 
data on the reproductive consequences of traits can call into question any 
number of nonadaptationist alternative hypotheses (e.g., male dominance is 
a side effect of something else) such as high levels of testosterone which are 
needed for proper sexual function; sexual dimorphism is due to phylogenetic 
inertia and or allometry; and so on) (see Alcock 1987; Sherman 1988, for 
additional arguments along these lines). 
Of course, the rare study which fails to find a positive relationship 
between dominance and fitness does not necessarily represent a major chal- 
lenge to Darwinian theory (Symons 1989). Such studies do, however, rep- 
resent minor challenges, and therefore call for indentification of the factors 
confounding adaptive outcomes. If a suitable confounding factor cannot be 
at least tentatively identified (e.g., the dominant male is sterile), an anomaly 
that begins as minor challenge to Darwinian theory can become a major 
challenge. The point is that to maintain the claim that a particular trait is an 
adaptation it is necessary to demonstrate that it functions as designed, or if 
,it does not, to explain why. It is not enough to simply assert that dominance 
(or anything else) must have been adaptive in the Pleistocene. 
As another example, consider female mate choice. Until recently, adap- 
tationist hypotheses about female choice have been thought to be problem- 
atic, in the absence of paternal care, because of the belief that choice quickly 
eliminates its selective rationale by eliminating heritable variability in male 
quality (e.g., Maynard Smith 1978). However, an empirical study designed 
to measure reproductive outcomes has been an important source of infor- 
mation leading to the demise of the aforementioned argument (see Partridge 
1980). Partridge demonstrated that allowing Drosophila females to choose 
their mates increased one component of their fitness (offspring survival). 
Thus, in addition to helping to identify female mate choice as an adaptation, 
6 The assumption that current outcomes will usually accurately reflect past outcomes is justi- 
fiable in the absence of specific counter-arguments (e.g., arguments positing new selection 
pressures). 
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Partidge’s results suggest that the proximate function of female choice in 
Drosophila is the production of healthier offspring (as opposed to, for ex- 
ample, functioning to produce sexier sons). More recent studies of the fitness 
effects of various behaviors in Drosophila have yielded additional insights 
about the selective background of particular Drosophila behaviors, as well 
as about the proximate function of particular behavioral adaptations (see 
Hoffmann and Cacoyianni 1989). Of course, studies such as Hoffmann’s and 
Cacoyianni’s do not deny that new theory and concomitant predictions about 
proximate design (e.g., Hamilton and Zuk 1982; Thornhill 1990) also have 
contributed to our understanding of female choice as an adaptation. Argu- 
ments criticizing the study of the design of adaptations (e.g., Wade 1987) 
are themselves deserving of criticism (e.g., Grafen 1988; Thornhill 1990). 
In the face of evidence like the above, it is not surprising that a well 
entrenched skepticism usually greets calls to abandon studies which seek to 
identify and explain adaptations in part by measuring fitness and its com- 
ponents (e.g., see Mayr’s 1983 rejoinder to Gould and Lewontin’s, 1979, 
critique). Ironically, when humans are the focal animal this skepticism is 
often absent because most people studying humans believe that learning and 
culture somehow decouple individuals from their evolved adaptations (e.g., 
see Durkheim’s sui generis view of culture and Dawkin’s memes). Thus, it 
is especially important that studies of humans be designed to indicate 
whether or not particular learned traits are adaptations. 
In humans, evidence of complexity, persistence, and proximate func- 
tion, by themselves, often are inadequate to indicate an adaptation because 
culture-even when conceived of as being almost totally independent of a 
history of natural selection-is also expected to (somehow) produce com- 
plex, proximately functional traints. For example, finding that people gen- 
erally strive to increase their individual wealth would not, in the context of 
Marxist theory, constitute detinitive evidence of a specific adaptation, even 
though such “economic rationality” is complex, persistent, and proximately 
functional. Marxism blames the ubiquity of wealth-maximizing behavior on 
the exportation of capitalism. I suggest, however, that one can refute, or at 
least demonstrate the incompleteness of, Marxist and other independent 
cultural theories of behavior by tracing proximate function through to ul- 
timate function. Thus, for example, in regard to the notion of economic 
rationality, as defined above, the relative efficacy of a Darwinian evolu- 
tionary approach can be demonstrated by searching for areas in which eco- 
nomic rationality is expected to conflict with reproductive rationality, such 
as in dealings with offspring and other relatives (see Turke 1985; 1988; 1989; 
Betzig 1986, ch. 3). Only from a Darwinian evolutionary perspective are 
individuals necessarily expected to be designed to disburse resources 
(wealth) in a manner that maximizes, or at least would have maximized, 
inclusive fitness. In general, tests calling for the measurement of reproduc- 
tive outcomes have the power to distinguish between hypotheses that view 
individual use of culture as comprised of adaptations from those which view 
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individual use of culture as somehow largely independent of adaptations (an 
excellent illustration of this point is found in Gibbs’ [1990] study of bird 
songs).’ 
Although accomplished in numerous instances (e.g., Clutton-Brock 
1988), it can be difficult both to determine whether an individual is behaving 
adaptively and to link an adaptive outcome with a specific adaptation (Grafen 
1988). Later, I discuss methods used to determine which (if any) humans 
behave adaptively. The general point to be made at this time, however, is 
that any aspect of a phenotype either is an individual-level adaptation or it 
is not, and it either yields an adaptive outcome in a particular environment 
or it does not. If the trait in question is an individual-level adaptation, then 
predictions from the correct adaptationist hypothesis should, once thought 
of, fare better than predictions from hypotheses holding that the trait is 1) 
epiphenomenal, 2) a product of random evolutionary forces, 3) a product of 
forces that are presumed to be independent of organic evolution (as is some- 
times thought of culture), or 4) a product of group selection (see Betzig 1989). 
In addition, there are two kinds of adaptationist hypotheses that need 
to be distinguished: those that predict adaptive outcomes and those that do 
not. Given sufficient environmental continuity, and only then, adaptations 
are expected to produce adaptive outcomes (e.g., Tingergen 1963; Symons 
1979). Thus, there are two possible fates for an adaptation&t hypothesis that 
predicts an adaptive outcome: the prediction obtains and therefore the hy- 
pothesis is supported; or the prediction fails and therefore the hypothesis is 
falsified. However, the failure of a predicted adaptive outcome can occur 
because the component of the hypothesis referring to sufficient environ- 
mental continuity is wrong, or because some other component of the hy- 
pothesis is wrong or incomplete. If it is determined that the hypothesis fails 
for the former reason, light nevertheless is shed on the selective background 
and ontogeny of the trait that the hypothesis attempts to describe (see later). 
Failure based on the latter reason should shift the focus of interest to al- 
ternative adaptationist and nonadaptationist hypotheses. In any case, 
7 By default, most people seem to believe that there is a “biological” basis to human behavior 
that is somehow overlaid by a cultural (nonbiological) basis to human behavior. This belief is 
widespread because many people conflate genetics with biology, and thereby conclude it proper 
to think of biology, which refers to life itself, the products of evolution, as the opposite of 
phenotypic plasticity, and thus as the opposite of culture (Alexander 1987). It is because of 
widespread acceptance of this false dichotomy that many people dismiss, a priori, an evolu- 
tionary approach to the study of learned, cultural behavior. Although dismissal of an evolu- 
tionary abproach on such grounds is invalid because the grounds themselves are invalid (Daly 
1982; Flinn and Alexander 1982: Turke 1984). it is nevertheless oossible for culture to have a 
significant independent effect on the human’phenotype. In other words, although there is no 
a priori basis for concluding that learning and culture necessarily decouple human behavior 
from organic evolution, there also is no a priori basis from which to conclude that learning and 
culture cannot decouple human behavior from organic evolution. Therefore it is reasonable and 
necessary to distinguish hypotheses that argue that cultural change and stasis result from a 
history of interaction by reproductively self-interested individuals (Alexander 1979) with hy- 
potheses arguing that other forces, naturally selected ideas (Cloak 1975; Dawkins 1976), and 
or cultural transmission rules (Boyd and Richerson 1983, wholly or partly direct the evolution 
of culture. 
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though, when predicted adaptive outcomes succeed, adaptationist hy- 
potheses gain support. The reason is that adaptive outcomes are highly or- 
chestrated events, which implies that an incorrect hypothesis is unlikely to 
correctly predict a specific adaptive outcome. Said another way, there are 
relatively numerous reasons not to expect a specific trait to produce an 
adaptive outcome (e.g., random forces, independent cultural evolution, 
etc.); therefore, a hypothesis that corrrectly predicts an adaptive outcome 
has a probability of being correct that is greater than chance (see also, Betzig 
1989). Thus, for example, finding a positive correlation between reputation 
for fierceness and mating/reproductive success is evidence favoring the hy- 
pothesis that, for Yanomamo males, striving to gain a reputation for tierce- 
ness is a faculative adaptation (Chagnon 1988a). Of course, as Chagnon 
notes, as hypotheses are fine-tuned they generate additional predictions (in- 
cluding about proximate design and function), which, if confirmed, lend 
increasing confidence. 
In short, the appropriateness of studying proximate design does not deny 
the appropriateness of seeking correlations with reproductive success and 
its components (Tinbergen 1963; Sherman 1988; Grafen 1988; Betzig 1989). 
Although correlations do not prove cause, they are suggestive, and they are 
especially so to the extent that they are predicted by a plausible hypothesis. 
Joan Silk’s (1980) study of adoption in Oceania can be used to further 
illustrate some of the foregoing points. Silk, challenged by Sahlins (1976), 
demonstrated that the high prevalence of adoption in many Oceanic societies 
conforms to expectations from Hamilton’s rule. Specifically, she demon- 
strated that adoptive parents tend overwhelmingly to be close genetic rela- 
tives of the children they adopt and also tend to have few or no dependent 
children of their own. 
The odds that the fit of Silk’s data with Hamilton’s rule are spurious 
are low because Hamilton’s rule poses stringent requirements relative to the 
range of possible outcomes, which might be expected on a number of theo- 
retical grounds, including the following 1) adoption may be an epiphenom- 
enal by-product of something else (e.g., maternal instinct gone awry); 2) 
random evolutionary forces-i.e., not selection-may have significantly in- 
fluenced the evolution of mechanisms that manifest adoptive behavior; 3) 
adoption may be a product of forces that are presumed to be independent 
of organic evolution (as is sometimes thought of culture); or 4) group se- 
lection may have molded the evolution of mechanisms that manifest adoptive 
behavior. 
What, though, if Silk’s study had failed to find that adoption in Oceania 
conformed to Hamilton’s rule? One cogent possibility is that an alternative 
adaptationist hypothesis explains adoption in Oceania. Perhaps adoption has 
as much to do with reciprocity or manipulation as it does with nepotism 
(which, incidentally, has not yet been ruled out but which can be tested by 
closer scrutiny of instances that appear to contradict, or at least appear not 
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to be fully explained by, Hamilton’s rule, if such occur [see Betzig 1989; 
Silk 19901). 
Another possibility is that the environments individuals encounter on 
Pacific atolls and islands differ so much from the environments of human 
evolution that adaptations involving child care and other transactions among 
relatives are off-track. Finding that adoption in Oceania is maladaptive would 
support this line of argument. A next step would be to seek where breakdown 
occurs in the ontongeny of behaviors comprising adoption. For example, do 
the environments of Oceania interfere with the close emotional attachment 
that usually develops between parents and their offspring? Or does con- 
finement in a small area cause maternal and paternal attachment to be gen- 
eralized, inappropriately (from the perspective of Hamilton’s rule), to chil- 
dren other than their own? As already noted, some evolutionary 
psychologists, such as Symons, would tend to prefer the second kind of 
explanation, because it posits that emotional mechanisms develop normally 
but are misapplied. The first kind of explanation, however, would tend to 
be ignored because it posits that emotional mechanisms, themselves, de- 
velop unusual characteritics, or even fail to develop. 
The main point of this section has been to argue that the success or 
failure of hypotheses predicting adaptive outcomes often imparts much in- 
formation about adaptations. Nothing has been said, however, to suggest 
that testing for adaptive outcomes is the only way to gain information about 
adaptations. Testing for adaptiveness is part of a larger approach (i.e., an 
approach that would, ideally, focus on all proximate and ultimate aspects 
of traits), and has strengths and weaknesses that vary with the situation (see 
Grafen 1988). All too often, in my opinion, the different components of this 
larger approach have been disparaged by glossing over the difficulties of a 
favored “sub-approach” while dwelling on the difficulties associated with 
the sub-approach(es) of one’s competitors. Cosmides and Tooby’s (1987, p. 
284) rationale for focussing study at the level of the psychological mechanism 
is a case in point. They argue that unlike behavior, psychological mecha- 
nisms are “invariant” components of the phenotype (see also Symons 1987a; 
1989). However, such a prescription ignores, among other things, the fact 
that psychological mechanisms are-as much as behavior-aspects of the 
phenotype and therefore also subject to variation due to environmental 
change. In this regard, Alexander (1990 [this issue]) and Smuts (1990) have 
likened the human psyche to the immune system, as being literally built from 
experience. In general, evolutionary psychologists pay little attention to the 
findings of neural scientists that demonstrate that the structure of the brain 
remains plastic at all stages of life. Thus, the hypothesis that human mate 
choice, for example, should be adaptive in contemporary societies would 
rest on as sound of a theoretical foundation as the hypothesis that mate 
choice mechanisms will develop invariantly in contemporary environments 
(i.e., will develop the same proximate characteristics they would have in 
the Pleistocene) (cf. Symons 1979; Buss 1989). It may be, however, that if 
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humans in some contemporary societies fail to choose mates adaptively it 
is because mechanisms have developed abnormally. It seems to me, though, 
that, notwithstanding the potentially disruptive effect of environmental nov- 
elty, because long-term directional and stabilizing selection are widely ev- 
ident in all forms of life, it generally is reasonable to at least consider hy- 
potheses that hold that the mechanisms underlying behavior, as well as the 
behavior itself, will develop in a manner that leads to adaptive outcomes. 
Prospects for Adaptive Human Behavior Outside the 
Pleistocene 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1989, p. 35) are of the opinion that since 
the end of the Pleistocene cultural change has been too fast to expect people 
to adjust adaptively; they acknowledge, however, that the human psyche 
must have been up to the task of making adaptive adjustments to the cultural 
environments of the Pleistocene or else full-blown capacity for culture would 
not have evolved (see also Symons 1979; 1987; Cosmides and Tooby 1987). 
These are empirical questions. However, even in terms of theory there is 
no firm basis for the opinion that cultural change was not too rapid before 
some people became sedentary and grew plants, but necessarily too rapid 
afterwards.8 What, in particular, is especially disruptive about becoming 
more sedentary and subsisting increasingly on domesticated plants and an- 
imals? Is it accompanying changes in technology, social organization, ide- 
ology, or combinations thereof? How much, when, where, and how fast did 
changes occur in each of these cultural realms, and how much do quantitative 
answers to these questions matter? Unfortunately, a theoretical basis for 
answering the preceding questions in inadequate largely because of uncer- 
tainty about the problems past environments imposed on hominids, and 
about the range of solutions that were employed (Smuts 1990). 
Cosmides, Symons, Tooby, and many others have largely bypassed the 
above issues by viewing the Pleistocene as a relatively featureless monolith, 
a constant that became suddenly complex and subject to rapid change only 
about 12,000 years ago (Alexander 1990). This simplistic view misleads them 
into believing that theirs is a thorough, widely agreed upon, understanding 
of how humans adapted to the environments of the Pleistocene, which in 
turn misleads them into believing that there is a well-developed foundation 
for the assertion that adaptive behavior is not to be expected outside the 
Pleistocene. It is, nevertheless, undeniable that information about the prob- 
lems humans faced in the Pleistocene should be used in the generation of 
hypotheses about human design and behavior (see Alexander and Noonan 
1979, for an example of this kind of “strategic modeling”), as should prob- 
lems faced during the 500 generations of the past 10,000 years. However, 
8 This takes an old theme-a priori, culture leads us off-track-and gives it a new twist: a 
priori, agriculture leads us off-track (Betzig pers. comm.). 
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as Smuts (1990) notes, information from the Pleistocene often is not well 
established, and often is not available in sufficient detail, to make this step 
in hypothesis generation as immediately informative as is implied in COS- 
mides and Tooby’s (1987, pp. 302-303) six-step formulation of the evolu- 
tionary approach. Thus, in other words, although Cosmides and Tooby cor- 
rectly outline the elements of an evolutionary approach, their insistence on 
a specific ordering of these elements is often impractical. What happens in 
the present informs our understanding of what happened in the past at least 
as much as vice versa, if for no other reasons than that the present is more 
visible and more subject to experimentation. A particularly relevant example 
is that evidence that people behave adaptively in environments which are, 
in some respects, very different from those of hunter-gatherers (see latter) 
suggests that environmental features unique to hunter-gathers had little role 
in shaping human evolution. In turn, in reconstructing our evolutionary his- 
tory we should know not to emphasize selection pressures unique to hunter- 
gatherers.’ 
In some respects Cosmides et al. are justified in assuming that the Pleis- 
tocene was relatively simple and constant. People apparently hunted and 
gathered throughout, albeit they did so in somewhat different ways at dif- 
ferent times and in different places (Lee and Devore 1968). However, as 
alluded to previously, foraging problems may not have been (at least not 
directly) the primary selective pressures that shaped the evolution of the 
human psyche. A cogent alternative hypothesis is that social competition 
for status, and cultural currencies related to status, such as fashion, dem- 
onstration of verbal and physical skills, and so on, primarily shaped the 
evolution of the human psyche (Humphrey 1976; Alexander 1987; 1989). In 
the light of this latter hypothesis-that is, if the primary function of the 
psyche was cultural, social competition, and if this pysche, as such, was 
fully evolved (or nearly so) before the end of the Pleistocene-it is probable 
(or at least not beyond consideration) that the cultural, social environments 
of the Pleistocene were about as complex and likely to contain novelty as 
present-day cultural, social environments. It may be, therefore, that we con- 
tinue to this day to use our brain for the primary proximate purpose for 
which it evolved (Alexander 1990; Turke 1989, p. 63), thus contesting the 
assertion that “There is no reason to suppose that any specific modern 
cultural practice is adaptive” (Tooby and Cosmides 1989, p. 35; see also 
Symons 1979; 1989). 
The foregoing arguments indicate that scholars with similar views of 
how evolution works, nevertheless have somewhat different (or more or less 
developed) views of what constituted the important selective pressures dur- 
ing human evolution (e.g., emphasis on problems specifically and directly 
9 In terms of Cosmides and Tooby’s (1987) schema, this represents the use of tests of current 
adaptiveness to inform step 2, which pertains to understanding the selection pressures respon- 
sible for molding the evolution of the human psyche. 
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related to foraging versus emphasis on social problems that remain cogent 
under many other subsistence regimens). These differences lead to alter- 
native hypotheses about the nature of the human psyche (see later). Dis- 
covering the circumstances under which people do or do not behave adap- 
tively in the range of contemporary environments is an important step toward 
testing the validity of each of these alternatives. 
GENERAL PURPOSE PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANISMS 
In explicating their hypothesis of the nature of the human psyche, Tooby 
and Cosmides (1989) have attempted to draw a parallel between the approach 
of some behaviorists in the field of psychology with the approach of a par- 
ticular group of anthropologists and biologists. They state: 
Not only have social scientists been all too inclined to think of the mind as 
a general purpose computer, but even evolutionarily informed scholars have 
been susceptible to a similar species of error: instead of a general learning 
mechanism, evolutionary biologists have used the concept of the psyche 
which operates “as if’ it were an inclusive fitness maximizer. Not only is 
this hypothetical entity impossible even in principle (Cosmides and Tooby 
19871, but as a conceptual tool it has interferred with productive research 
directions (pp. 31-32). 
Symons (1987a; 1989) and Kitcher (1985) have argued along similar lines. 
The point to be made here, however, is that in one important sense Tooby 
and Cosmides (as well as probably Symons and Kitcher) apparently also 
believe that the human psyche does operate as if it were an inclusive fitness 
maximizer. That is, they believe that “the psyche is almost certainly com- 
prised of a multitude of domain-specitic, special-purpose adaptive mecha- 
nisms, organized into a coevolved, highly intricate architecture” (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1989, p. 31, emphasis added), and they of course would also 
recognize that by another name this highly intricate architecture is an ad- 
aptation-an evolved mechanism with the evolved function of coordinating 
other mechanisms in a manner that maximizes inclusive fitness. When the 
anthropologists and biologists who are being criticized (Alexander, Betzig, 
Chagnon, Crook and Crook, Dickemann, Irons, and Turke have been singled 
out in the articles referred to earlier) hypothesize as if the human psyche 
operates as an inclusive fitness maximizer, they have in mind exactly this 
kind of mechanism or “architecture.” Moreover, that evolution “has pro- 
duced a conscious striving for intermediate goals-such as a good diet or 
sexual satisfaction” (Irons 1983, p. 200)-is an insight that did not have to 
wait for Symons (1989, p. 140). Thus, it is false to imply that Alexander et 
al. believe that the so-called “inclusive fitness maximizer” is not comprised 
of proximate mechanisms (molecular, physiological, and psychological) that 
generate specific proximate goals that somehow are weighted and coordi- 
Which Humans Behave Adaptively? 319 
nated (see Alexander 1979, ch. 3, for numerous examples).” With the ex- 
ception of some outdated behaviorists (which unfortunately includes much 
of modern-day psychology [Leda Cosmides, personal communication]), we 
all have been working toward understanding the nature of the more and less 
specific mechanisms that constitute the human psyche. The debate is about 
how to proceed. I’ 
Symons has asserted that we will not learn anything about mechanisms, 
or much about anything else, by focusing on reproductive outcomes in con- 
temporary environments (see, for example, a list of propositions which Sy- 
mons [1989, p. 1391 claims are not illuminated by Betzig’s [1988a] study of 
reproductive outcomes on Ifaluk Atoll). Barkow (1984) and Tooby and Cos- 
mides (1989) seem to share this view. I suggest, though, that the reason for 
this conclusion on the part of Symons et al. is that they begin with the 
assumption that the mechanisms that constitute the psyche are too specific 
to expect adaptive behavior outside the Pleistocene. In other words, they 
seem to deny the possibility that the design of the human psyche is flexible 
enough (i.e., designed to cope with a specific range of novel social condi- 
tions) to produce adaptive behavior in contemporary environments. By ig- 
noring, or deeming irrelevant, studies that actually measure reproductive 
outcomes, their argument is reduced to tautology: the psyche must be de- 
signed to overcome specific problems that are, in some crucial respect, 
unique to the Pleistocene because humans behave maladaptively outside the 
Pleistocene, and humans must behave maladaptively outside the Pleistocene 
because their psyches are designed to overcome specific problems that are, 
in some crucial respect, unique to the Pleistocene. 
A theoretical basis for characterizing the human psyche as relatively 
(but not infinitely) general purpose (i.e., flexible enough to deal with a fair 
amount of novelty) recently has been made explicit in two papers by Alex- 
ander (1989; 1990). Alexander’s hypothesis, in essence, is that concious- 
ness-through providing an ability to produce scenarios in a way that co- 
ordinates information from other, often more specific mechanisms (or 
” Symons (1989, p. 140) seems to be arguing that so-called Darwinian anthropologists are 
unaware that proximate goals underly ultimate goals, which, if believed, would suggest that 
the focus by Darwinian anthropologists on ultimate goals cannot be related to the illumination 
of proximate goals and their underlying mechanisms. 
” Although we all are interested in understanding human nature, some more than others have 
been interested, at least in specific instances, in understanding human nature not as an end in 
of itself but in order to better understand specific phenomena (e.g., despotism, demographic 
transition, warfare, moral systems). Of course, a large number of mechanisms probably underly 
the behaviors resulting in despotism, demographic transition, and other complex phenomena. 
Thus, there is justification for studying these phenomena other than by a piecemeal study of 
mechanisms. Moreover, even relatively simple phenomena such as status-linked female infan- 
ticide (e.g., Dickemann 1979) are likely to be played out by numerous, complexly interacting 
mechanisms, including consciousness. This contrasts starkly, however, with the specific and 
in my opinion overly simplistic psychological argument Barkow (1984) offers as the missing 
link in Dickemann’s hypothesis about infanticide. If it were as simple as Barkow suggests to 
correctly fill in the proximate, psychological, mechanistic details of hypotheses like Dicke- 
mann’s, Dickemann certainly would be remiss in not doing so. As it is, Barkow has nor supplied 
a constructive critique. 
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algorithms, epigenetic rules, rules of thumb, etc.)-evolved to deal with the 
range of novel social conditions that culture-bearing individuals have been 
generating ever since the first glimmerings of culture. Said another way, 
social novelty was a primary selective pressure in the Pleistocene, con- 
sciousness is one of the mental organs that evolved to cope with social 
novelty, and therefore we should not assume that social novelty in contem- 
porary environments necessarily outstrips the ability of the human psyche 
to generate adaptive strategies. 
In the light of the foregoing hypothesis, let us now examine the argu- 
ments Symons has advanced in regard to the study of adaptation and adap- 
tiveness in contemporary environments. In a discussion of cross cousin mar- 
riage Symons (1989, p. 135) states that “unless at least one mechanism owes 
its form to the differential reproductive success of individuals who did or 
did not marry cross cousins in ancestral populations-cross cousin marriage 
per se is not a Darwinian adaptation.” His implication is that there is no 
such mechanism, and therefore determining whether cross-cousin marriage 
is manifested adaptively is a bankrupt enterprise. Symons (1989, pp. 138- 
9) argues similarly against Crook and Crook’s (1988) attempt to demonstrate 
that polyandry may be adaptive in particular Tibetan environments. He notes 
that particular contingencies in the current Tietan environment, such as land 
shortages, primogenitor, and taxation, did not exist in the Pleistocene, and 
he suggests therefore that there could not have been selection for the specific 
mechanisms that are implied by Crook and Crook’s hypothesis. In other 
words, Symons believes that no specific mechanism evolved to cope with 
the specific problems that cross-cousin marriage and polyandry are hypoth- 
esized to solve. 
However, as noted earlier, consciousness, in interaction with other 
components of the psyche, such as cognitive ability, may be just such a 
mechanism. Arguing specifically against Symons’ polyandry example, Alex- 
ander (1990 [this issue]; see also Betzig 1989, pp. 318-9) hypothesizes 1) that 
consciousness, through building and choosing between scenarios that some- 
how coordinate other more specific algorithms (e.g., algorithms attributing 
positive value to achieving status and having sex), evolved to deal with a 
range of novel social conditions that were present long before the end of the 
Pleistocene; and 2) the novelty of particular contingencies pertaining to mat- 
ing and marriage in present day Tibet may well be within this range.” 
It is important to recognize that because Symons believes he has made 
a valid first-principles kind of argument against the hypothesis that polyandry 
represents an evolved adaptive strategy, he sees no purpose in determining 
” Dawkins (1982, pp. 27-28) has presented an argument pertaining to human polyandry that, 
as Symons notes, closely resembles his own. However, as I have noted (Turke 1984), Dawkins 
also considers a possibility that is more akin to Alexander’s hypothesis. That is, after presenting 
the argument which Symons claims supports his own, Dawkins states, “or natural selection 
had to have favored the universal occurrence of genes programming some complex ‘conditional 
strategy’.” Symons fails to mention this. 
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whether contemporary peoples consistently make adaptive decisions about 
how and when to marry polyandrously. The alternative that I am advocating 
is that 1) throughout human evolutionary history establishing a relationship 
between a man and a woman and their kin has been a social problem in- 
volving the assessment and manipulation of, among other things, status and 
resources; 2) mechanisms (e.g., consciousness, cognitive ability) evolved to 
coordinate solutions to these problems; and therefore 3) unless marriage in 
Tibet involves something more novel than the assessment and manipulation 
of status and resources, marriage patterns in post-Pleistocene Tibet are ex- 
pected to be adaptive. If we find that they are adaptive, support is given to 
this view of mechanisms and to this view of what marriage is a solution to. 
If we find maladaption, this view of mechanisms and what marriage is a 
solution to is questioned. In either case, however, additional research, es- 
pecially research focussing on proximate design (which Cosmides, Symons, 
Tooby, and others appropriately advocate), would be required to complete 
our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying the behaviors 
in question. 
The foregoing debate centers on disagreement over the specificity of 
psychological mechanisms. Two points bear emphasizing: 1) Many hy- 
potheses derived by Alexander et al. seem to require that some mechanisms 
of the human psyche are relatively general-purpose; Symons, in particular, 
appears to deny such a possibility (however both Alexander and Symons 
view the psyche as much more specific-purpose than theorists who view the 
psyche as a blank slate). Thus, Symons might argue, for example, that al- 
though stepping out of the way of a fast moving truck is fitness enhancing, 
none of the neural mechanisms that people possess have been designed di- 
rectly to achieve that end: trucks were not present in the Pleistocene. The 
alternative view, however, is that Symons et al. sometimes get the level of 
specificity wrong, and the tendency has been to err in the direction of being 
overly specific. In this case, humans may have evolved neural mechanisms 
that have been designed specifically to achieve the end of avoiding heavy, 
fast moving objects; whether they happen to be rhinoceri or trucks is largely 
irrelevant. (I say largely because people probably are poor judges of how 
much time they should allow to step out of the way of heavy objects that 
move more than twice as fast as rhinoceri, at least until they have used 
consciousness, cognition, and perhaps other relatively general-purpose men- 
tal mechanisms to acquire what may be referred to as indirect experience). 
2) It should be clear by now that “mechanisms” are integral to argu- 
ments suggesting that the human psyche is in some ways general purpose- 
albeit much remains to be known about the mechanistic details underlying 
this general purposeness. Thus, it is an overstatement to assert, as more 
than one of my colleagues has, that the human mind as characterized by so- 
called “Darwinian anthropologists” resembles a chess-playing computer 
program that says nothing more than “win.” Mistaking an interest in who 
wins (i.e., behaves adaptively) for a lack of interest in evolved mechanisms 
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is an error that follows from a failure to recognize that knowing how adaptive 
outcomes correlate with environmental variation contributes to an under- 
standing of the nature of mechanisms. 
In sum, if social competition was a primary selective pressure through- 
out human evolution, and consciousness evolved largely as a result of this 
pressure, then Cosmides, Symons, and Tooby (and Durkheim, Sahlins, et 
al.) are premature in their conviction that the psyche is such that we should 
not expect to find adaptive tracking of the environment by people in con- 
temporary societies. How do we decide between these alternative views? 
Empirically, by determining which people in the wide range of present-day, 
post-Pleistocene environments are behaving adaptively and which are not. 
This work has begun, and is summarized in the following. 
WHICH HUMANS BEHAVE ADAPTIVELY? 
Two approaches have been used to assess whether or not contemporary 
peoples behave adaptively. Kitcher (1985) and Symons (1987b) have been 
the primary advocates of the first of these approaches (hereafter the Kitcher- 
Symons approach). It seems to me, however, that many scholars have spec- 
ulated along similar lines, thus perhaps accounting for the widespread con- 
clusion that human behavior is off-track (see Turke 1989, pp. 62-63). 
Symons (1989, p. 140) proposes that we “compare the actions of eth- 
nographic subjects with an imaginary social engineer’s ideal design for fitness 
maximizing actions.” He then cites Kitcher’s (1985) critique of Dickemann’s 
(1979) hypothesis which argues, among other things, that female infanticide 
in upper caste India is adaptive from the perspective of the perpetrators. 
Kitcher asserts that such infanticide is not adaptive because more fitness 
would accrue to parents who instead of killing their daughters provided them 
with wet nurses. The problem with this approach is that if the ideal social 
engineer (Kitcher!) leaves out even one constraint, the whole exercise may 
be for naught. For example, Alexander (1988) points out that as soon as one 
recognizes that wet nurses are not free of charge, or that a daughter’s pres- 
ence can decrease the status of her entire family (which are just two of many 
potential constraints Kitcher ignores), one has the beginning of a basis for 
doubting that hiring a wet nurse is adaptive relative to infanticide. 
Many others have tried to play the role of ideal social engineer: Symons 
(1987b) avers that wealthy men in Western societies would buy islands and 
build harems on them, if they were truly behaving adaptively. However, no 
man is an island. What if, as has been hypothesized (Alexander 1974; 1987; 
Betzig 1986), behaviors that tend to have the effect of leveling reproductive 
opportunities constitute strategies that have been, and perhaps continue to 
be, adaptive in environments subject to specific kinds of escalating social 
competition (see Turke 1989, pp. 82-85)? 
Similarly, Symons suggests that men should strive to be frequent donors 
at sperm banks; and that white women, because their babies currently are 
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in demand on the adoption market, should strive to take advantage of that 
market. What, though, are the potential constraints? I personally do not 
have immediate access to a sperm bank (or if I do, I don’t know about it). 
I presumably could enter medical school and thereby gain access, but would 
the costs exceed the benefits? Just how many sperm donors actually sire 
children? All of them? One out of a thousand? Moreover, a strong motivation 
to donate at sperm banks may require, given the recentness of their inven- 
tion, that desire to maximize reproductive success be brought into the con- 
scious. However, has likelihood of a conscious desire to maximize repro- 
ductive success been suppressed by selection because it produced offsetting 
social handicaps? Cogent arguments have been given for keeping related 
“selfish” motivations out of the conscious (see Alexander 1987). In regard 
to the adoption scenario, what unknown costs might be associated with 
psyches which have been designed so that they feel that bearing babies and 
giving them up for adoption is a positive experience? How would potential 
nepotists and reciprocators react on learning that a particular woman is 
bearing children only to give them up for adoption? Symons must at least 
begin to ask such questions before jumping to the conclusion that individuals 
who fail to act on his scenarios are behaving maladaptively. 
Tooby and Cosmides (1989, p. 35), in explicitily advocating the Kitcher- 
Symons approach, state that “The initiation or voluntary participation in 
modern war games by Germans, Japanese, Russians, North Koreans, Cam- 
bodians, Argentinians, Iraquis, or Americans, or their elites, do not seem 
to have enhanced the fitness of those involved.” Their list, of course, is of 
countries in which many young men recently have died for a losing cause. 
But surely, even in the Pleistocene-when according to Tooby and Cosmides 
behavior was still adaptive-people died for losing causes. In other words, 
even in the Pleistocene people certainly behaved in ways that sometimes 
failed to pay off, just as nonhuman organisms do even in undisturbed en- 
vironments. The point is that evidence that individuals take calculated risks 
is not a sufficient basis for labelling the species as off-track. Tooby and 
Cosmides must have something else in mind in so labelling contemporary 
humans, and although they might prove to be right their evidence is not 
sufficient for their claim. What, then, is their point? Certainly they realize 
that the effects of fighting on population fitness (i.e., group fitness) are prob- 
ably irrelevant. Moreover, with regard to what they refer to as “voluntary 
particpation,” if one considers the likely fate of young German men, for 
example, who did not give the impression of voluntarily joining Hitler’s 
army, it is far from clear that such volunteerism is indeed individually mal- 
adaptive. 
Barkow (1989, p. 116) presents the centuries old practice of “cupping” 
(or “bleeding”) as an example of an unequivocally maladaptive cultural trait. 
In other words, he assumes that cupping would not be part of an ideal social 
engineer’s plan. Ironically, on the day I read Barkow’s claim I also happened 
to read papers by Kluger (1978) and Weinberg (1984) presenting evidence 
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indicating that, in combination with fever, iron depletion-which according 
to Kluger can be facilitated by cupping-has evolved in many species, in- 
cluding humans, as an effective response to bacterial infection. In any case, 
even if it is wrong to suggest that cupping sometimes benefits patients, if 
patients can be convinced to pay for the procedure it may well be adaptive 
for physicians to do it. Manipulation of just this sort is widespread in nature 
(e.g., Dawkins 1982). 
The larger issue is that Barkow (1989) has left the mainstream of evo- 
lutionary theory by divorcing the individual from the concept of adaptive- 
ness. He is concerned with traits or information being adaptive or mal- 
adaptive to society or culture. I3 (As Alexander [1988] and Maynard Smith 
[ 19881 note, Kitcher [ 19851 errs similarly by giving significance to traits low- 
ering mean population fitness.) However, adaptiveness is a concept that 
should be judged in the currency of relative effect on individual (inclusive) 
fitness; and making the best of a bad situation is adaptive. In other words, 
most evolutionary biologists agree that it matters little, or not at all, that the 
average fitness of the group (or culture or society) is reduced; and it matters 
little, or not at all, that fitness is reduced on some kind of absolute scale. 
In short, it is difficult to know if an imagined behavioral strategy is 
really more adaptive than actual strategies because it is difficult to also 
imagine all the constraints that would apply. Kitcher et al. stop short of 
considering even the most obvious constraints, perhaps because their “em- 
pirical approach” is actually little more than an afterthought founded on the 
a priori theoretical conviction that human behavior must be maladaptive 
outside the Pleistocene (see above). 
The failure to think hard about how particular behaviors of modern 
humans might be adaptive is reminiscent of some late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century naturalists who were ready to reject Darwinism, or at least 
severely restrict its scope, because as Gould (1977) notes (in his essay on 
the huge antlers of Irish elk) they were too ready to believe that it would 
be impossible to account for many of the unique and unusual features of 
organisms in terms of individual reproductive advantage. Thus, it seems that 
the Kitcher-Symons approach would easily, but wrongly, attribute mal- 
adaptive behavior to all kinds of animals. Sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus 
nerka), for example, go to a lot of trouble to return to their place of birth 
to spawn, and, as far as I know, no one has thought of a good adaptive 
explanation for his behavior. Nevertheless, one suspects that few biologists 
therefore believe that salmon behave maladaptively; rather, most probably 
believe that the correct hypothesis has not been thought of. Thus, although 
I3 Being out of the mainstream does not make an argument wrong. However, to argue as Barkow 
does it is necessary to develop, or at least cite, carefully derived models that explicate how it 
is possible that cultural group selection may be important in human evolution (see Boyd and 
Richerson 1985). 
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more and better empirical studies are needed, there is an even greater need 
for more and better hypotheses (Alexander personal communication). l4 
A second approach that has been widely used to assess adaptiveness is 
in some ways exactly the opposite of that advocated by Kitcher and Symons. 
This approach involves focusing on actual traits, with actual constraints, to 
derive and test hypotheses that can potentially account for how the traits 
in question are (or were) adaptive. Alexander (1988) emphasizes that it is 
especially important to derive this kind of adaptationist hypothesis for traits 
that seem to be the most difficult to describe in adaptive terms (e.g., the 
avunculate, moral behavior, Irish elk antlers). Thus, instead of attempting 
to imagine strategies that would be more adaptive than, say, female infan- 
ticide in upper caste India, the idea is to hypothesize how infanticide might 
be adaptive in upper caste India and then attempt to falsify the hypothesis 
by deriving testable predictions that must follow if the hypothesis is correct. 
This approach may or may not involve the measurement of reproductive 
differentials (i.e., estimates of inclusive fitness). In the case of infanticide 
in India, it would be appropriate to model reproductive outcomes that occur 
from variable levels of infanticide, which potentially could rule out the pos- 
sibility that infanticide is ever adaptive, but it generally would be inappro- 
priate to compare the reproductive success of actual individuals who do and 
do not commit infanticide. The reason is that models are always simplifi- 
cations of reality and therefore, unlike for real individuals, constraints can 
be readily controlled. Thus, the comparative method as employed by Dick- 
emann provides a better test of her hypothesis than could reasonably be 
expected of a test that compared reproductive outcomes. There are many 
similar examples of comparative tests that do not require the measurement 
of reproductive differentials, many of which have been recently reviewed 
or presented for the first time in Betzig, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Turke 
(1988). 
Still other hypotheses, although logically identical to Dickemann’s, re- 
quire the measurement of reproductive outcomes. For example, consider 
the argument that individuals, as a result of their evolved design, generate 
and use culture adaptively. Irons (1976; 1979; 1980) was the first to explicitly 
frame this hypothesis, and he was also the first to test it with demographic 
data (see also Alexander 1979; Chagnon 1979). This hypothesis predicts a 
positive relationship between wealth, status, and inclusive fitness (or, more 
precisely, between power and inclusive fitness), and therefore obviously can 
be tested by studies which estimate individual inclusive fitness. The basis 
of this prediction is that the availability of resources limits reproduction (see 
I4 As Williams (1966) correctly notes, some adaptations can be recognized as such by reference 
to principles of engineering, e.g., the same engineering principles that make birds fly also make 
airplanes fly. My point, though, is that you cannot assess adaptiveness (as opposed to assessing 
whether a trait is an adaptation) by comparison with an ideal derived from engineering principles 
because single traits often are compromised by the requirements of other traits, ultimately in 
the interests of reproduction (e.g., there is reason to believe that birds would fly even better 
than they do if their effort were devoted solely to flying). 
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Turke 1989). Moment by moment individuals are faced with a series of social 
and economic options. Particular options will be adaptive relative to others, 
and therefore if individuals regularly choose adaptively, a positive relation- 
ship should result between wealth, status, and inclusive fitness. On the other 
hand, no relationship is expected if environmental novelty, independent cul- 
tural evolution, and or group selection are important factors.15 
Traditional societies The relationship between wealth, status, and inclusive 
fitness in traditional (i.e., kinship) societies has been the subject of more 
than a dozen studies (reviewed in Betzig 1988, pp. 5-6). In all, well over 
one hundred societies have been examined, yielding zero instances in which 
the relationship is not positive. Here, two studies, the broadest and the most 
in-depth, will be briefly discussed. 
Laura Betzig (1986) examined a standard cross cultural sample (Mur- 
dock and White 1969) of 104 politically autonomous traditional societies and 
found that without exception male status, which she defines in terms of 
ability to win conflicts of interest, was postively related to number of wives 
and or concubines. However, because of its breadth, her study stops short 
of actually measuring inclusive fitness or even reproductive success. She 
does, though, show that high status males, in addition to having greater 
access to mates, have more resources to invest in offspring and are better 
able to prevent cuckoldry. Until someone demonstrates that men with two 
or more wives (sometimes thousands more) generally have fewer surviving 
offspring than men with zero or one wife, it is safe to conclude that Betzig’s 
study lends broad-based support to the predicted relationship between 
wealth, status, and inclusive fitness. 
In sacrificing breadth for depth, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder’s (1987a,b) 
study of the relationship between wealth and lifetime reproductive success 
among the Kipsigis of Kenya comes close to actually measuring inclusive 
fitness. Her study also is exemplary in that she focuses on both males and 
females, finding in both cases that there is a positive relationship between 
wealth and lifetime reproductive success. For males, polygyny is the major 
causal factor; however, because the relationship between wealth and lifetime 
reproductive success is also positive for females, it is clear that polygamy 
is not a necessary cause (see also Turke and Betzig 1985). 
Thus, in sum, a careful but as yet incomplete examination of the re- 
lationship between wealth, status, and inclusive fitness in over 100 traditional 
societies yields no grounds for rejecting the hypothesis in question. In other 
words, individuals in traditional societies appear to use culture adaptively. 
One implication is that the human psyche is relatively general-purpose, in 
I5 Of course, finding a positive relationship does not prove that individuals behave adaptively. 
Even given a positive relationship, there is room for maladaptive behavior to be occurring. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis is falsified by a failure to confirm the predicted relationship. 
Unfortunately, confirming or discontirming the prediction is not always straightforward, as is 
illustrated below in the text. 
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the sense of having been designed to deal with a range of social novelties, 
which is inclusive of the cultural complexities in most or all contemporary 
traditional societies. Another implication is that hypotheses about pyschol- 
ogical mechanisms should not be derived in reference to selection pressures 
that are unique to Pleisiocene hunter-gatherers. Some of the most relevant 
selective pressures are likely to include social and cultural problems per- 
taining to status (e.g., Alexander 1979; Irons 1979b; Betzig 1986; Turke 
1989), and there is no reason to believe that the past 500 generations of 
selection (post-Pleistocene) have not had as much effect as the 500 hundred 
which preceded them. 
Nontraditional societies Economic-minded demographers and demographic- 
minded economists also have been interested in the relationship between 
wealth, status, and reproduction. It has often been suggested that if children 
can be considered “normal goods,” then, as for other normal goods, people 
with more resources should have a consumption advantage over people with 
fewer resources (e.g., Becker 1960). This idea been modified and tested by 
dozens of economists and demographers in dozens of societies, which in the 
demographic literature are referred to as more and less developed countires 
(MDC’s and LDC’s). Almost without exception, the extent of development 
(or “modernization,” see Easterlin 1978) even in LDC’s is greater than in 
the traditional societies studied by anthropologists such as Betzig and Bor- 
gerhoff Mulder (see above). A large proportion of these studies have been 
reviewed recently by Mueller and Short (1983). 
First, Mueller and Short review what are referred to as “macrolevel 
studies that relate measures of income to measures of fertility in a multi- 
variate context” (p. 606). In 22 multinational studies involving both LDC’s 
and MDC’s they find that the relationship between income and fertility is 
statistically significant and positive in 4 cases, positive but not significant 
(or significance was not tested) in 16 cases, significant and negative in 10 
cases, and negative but not significant (or significance was not tested) in 11 
cases (cases exceed the number of studies because some studies conduct 
more than one test). The sample size of the individual studies that were 
reviewed range from 10 geographic regions in Greece to 82 MDC’s and 
LDC’s; countries include, among many others, Chile, India, and Mexico. 
In what are referred to as “household” or “microlevel” studies (n = 
17) the relationship in LDC’s between wealth (income) and fertility is positive 
and significant in 16 cases, positive but not significant (or significance was 
not tested) in 11 cases, negative and significant in 6 cases, and negative and 
not significant (or significance was not tested) in 15 cases (cases exceed the 
number of studies because some studies conduct more than one test). Sam- 
ples ranged in size from 150 farms in Nepal to 8434 households in the Phi- 
lipines . 
Finally, Mueller and Short review studies of “the asset-fertility relation 
in LDC’s” (assets are livestock, farm size, land quality, etc). Of 13 studies, 
328 P. W. Turke 
the relationship between assets and fertility is positive and significant in 10 
cases, positive but not significant (or significance was not tested) in 4 cases, 
negative and significant in 2 cases, and negative but not significant (or sig- 
nificance was not tested) in 5 cases (again, cases exceed the number of 
studies because some studies conduct more than one test). 
Mueller and Short argue that all of the studies they reviewed suffer from 
significant methodological difficulties, but they conclude that a positive re- 
lationship between wealth and fertility gets increasingly difficult to find as 
the focus of study shifts to more technologically advanced societies. Such 
a trend becomes even more apparent, I suggest, by the inclusion of analyses 
from traditional societies which, as shown, always yield a positive relation- 
ship between wealth, status, and reproduction. The conclusion I draw from 
the above data is that, although there is a firm basis for believing that people 
in traditional contemporary societies track their environments adaptively, 
the jury is still out with regard to people in more developed contemporary 
societies. One major obstacle standing in the way of a firmer conclusion is 
that demographers and economists have been concerned with fertility, not 
inclusive fitness. In any case, it should be clear by now that the claim that 
people long ago stopped behaving adaptively rests on a less than solid foun- 
dation even when directed at people living in relatively developed societies. 
What about the most technologically developed societies? Unfortu- 
nately, again, a definitive conclusion is not possible. Some studies, such as 
Vining’s (1986), suggest a weak negative relationship between wealth and 
inclusive fitness; others, such as Essock-Vitale’s (1984), suggest a weak 
positive relationship; and still others, such as Freedman and Thornton’s 
(1982) suggest that no relationship exists between wealth and inclusive fit- 
ness. Of these three studies, Vining’s has been severely criticized on both 
methodological and theoretical grounds (e.g., Daly and Wilson 1986; Gaulin 
1986; Irons 1986; Kaplan and Hill 1986; Kurland 1986; Flinn 1987). Never- 
theless, Vining’s study is often cited (in my experience, usually by anony- 
mous referees) as definitive proof of maladaptive behavior in technologically 
advanced societies. Essock-Vitale’s study is noteworthy not so much for 
evidence suggesting that very wealthy U.S. women have more surviving 
children than U.S. women of average wealth, but for demonstrating that this 
difference is small-smaller than, for example, the difference Borgerhoff 
Mulder found in her comparison of poor and wealthy Kipsigis women (cited 
previously). Freedman and Thornton’s study is noteworthy (but nonetheless 
typical of demographic studies) in that it illustrates what can go wrong when 
research is conducted in an evolutionary theoretical vacuum. Specifically, 
in their massive longitudal study of the relationship between wealth and 
fertility in present-day Detroit, Freedman and Thornton eliminated from 
their analyses individuals who did not marry and those who married more 
than once. However, if the poor marry less often than the wealthy (e.g., 
because they are less attractive as potential mates, are more frequently in- 
carcerated, or are more likely to have died before reaching marriagable age), 
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and if the wealthy (especially males) remarry more often than the poor, it 
is not surprising that Freedman and Thornton’s study fails to tell us anything 
definitive about the adaptiveness of behavior in technologically advanced 
societies. 
Reference groups The hypothesis from economic theory that the wealthy 
should be able to afford, and therefore have, more children (see aforemen- 
tioned) has sometimes been refined in accordance with the observation that 
individuals usually 1) do not behave as though they are competing equally 
with everyone and 2) do not define success in absolute terms. Rather, in- 
dividuals appear to compete within “reference groups” (Frank 1985). For 
example, evidence suggests that workers in factory “A” will be more con- 
cerned with changes in the wages of their coworkers than changes in the 
wages of workers in factory “B;” similarly, a worker who gets a five dollar 
raise when his coworkers get a 10 dollar raise generally is not happy with 
what in absolute terms is an improvement (Frank 1985). 
As Frank notes, the fact that competition often is most intense within 
reference groups may have much to do with the fact that people lived in 
small groups that interacted with only a few other small groups throughout 
most of human evolutionary history. This suggests that modern-day refer- 
ence groups should be expected to consist primarily of individuals with 
whom one frequently interacts, such as family, coworkers, and neighbors, 
albeit the mass media and the mobility made possible by modern technology 
complicate the notion of reference groups and make them less tractable 
entities. 
In demographic studies, different approaches have been used to take 
into account the perspective that people make social, economic, and repro- 
ductive decisions in reference to members of a specific group or groups. The 
most well known of these is the relative income approach (Easterlin 1978), 
in which the effect of wealth on an individual’s fertility is evaluated by 
comparison to the wealth of his (or her) parents, himself at a younger age, 
or to individuals in the same occupation, ethnic group, social class, and so 
on. These studies, which have focused almost exclusively on groups within 
technologically advanced societies, yield more consistently positive results 
than studies such as Vining’s which pay no heed to the concept of reference 
groups (see also Freedman 1963; Easterlin 1980; Johnston and Lean 1985; 
Hill and Hill). 
Two points pertaining to the notion of reference groups remain to be 
discussed. The first is that, with the exception of Frank’s (1985) analysis of 
economic (but not reproductive) competition, facts and theories of human 
evolution have not been considerations in determining who is expected to 
constitute a particular individual’s reference group. Moreover, the econo- 
mists and demographers who have employed Easterlin’s relative income 
approach have been interested in fertility, not inclusive fitness. Thus, there 
330 P. W. Turke 
is room for improvement in employing the concept of reference groups in 
the analysis of the relationship between wealth, status, and inclusive fitness. 
Second, paying attention to the concept of reference groups is reason- 
able, in evolutionary terms, in so far as decisions about the distribution of 
parental resources, which ultimately determine offspring quality and quan- 
tity, depend on how others are distributing such resources. In other words, 
given that social competition within and between small groups has been the 
primary force driving human evolution (Alexander 1989; and see the afore- 
mentioned), it would have been adaptive during evolutionary history to make 
social, economic, and reproductive decisions in reference to the individuals 
with whom one interacts (competitively) and with whom one’s immediate 
descendants are likely to interact. Given such, one can then argue about 
whether the continuation of such behavior in contemporary societies is adap- 
tive or maladaptive (i.e., on-track or off-track). 
To illustrate how ma/adaptive behavior can arise through making de- 
cisions based on the actions of, say, one’s occupational reference group, 
consider a hypothetical cohort of children born in the U.S. in 1955. Suppose 
that on average 2.0 surviving children had been produced by 1990 by the 
individuals of the 1955 cohort who had become physicians, and that on 
average 2.2 surviving children had been produced by 1990 by the individuals 
who had become clerks. If the reference group hypothesis is correct, there 
should be a positive relationship between wealth and fitness within each 
occupational group. However, given that clerks are generally poorer and of 
lower status than physicians, which implies that most physicians could have 
been clerks but not vice versa, the physicians nevertheless appear to have 
been behaving maladaptively by making social, economic, and reproductive 
decisions that led to them becoming physicians and not clerks. Thus, in other 
words, the foregoing example is about an evolved design which, given only 
the conditions outlined, leads in a particular modern environment to a mal- 
adaptive (i.e., off-track) outcome. 
On the other hand, an adaptive (i.e., on-track) outcome might obtain if 
1) temporary reproductive restraint allows one to maintain or increase social 
and economic success, and 2) social and economic and success continue 
over the long run, as they have in the past, to have a positive impact on 
inclusive fitness.16 Thus, in terms of the example, if competition to become 
a successful physician has been especially fierce during the 1970’s and 80’s, 
relative to competition among clerks, and if effort to reproduce reduces effort 
available for social and economic strivings (see Turke 1989), temporary re- 
ductions in reproduction by physicians may eventually allow increases in 
reproduction at some later time in life or even in subsequent generations 
I6 In a partial review of the literature, Gaulin (1986) and Kaplan and Hill (1986) have concluded 
that even for males in the most developed societies there is no empirical foundation for the 
claim that wealth and inclusive fitness are inversely related. For females, evidence for an inverse 
relationship is strong enough to be termed suggestive only for brief periods of time, particularly 
the past 20-30 years. The point, they argue, is that such anomalies, if they exist, may turn out 
to be unnoticeable “blips” when viewed on an evolutionary time scale. 
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(cf. Philippi and Seger 1989; Rogers 1989). In such a case, it may very well 
be adaptive to focus one’s competitive efforts against other physicians, be- 
cause it is other physicians, not clerks, who most threaten one’s own social 
and economic standing, and because, in most cases, a physician’s chance 
for social economic success depends on success as a physician. Thus, in 
other words, it may prove to be appropriate, even in today’s technologically 
advanced societies, to make social, economic, and reproductive decisions 
in reference to how such decisions are being made by one’s closest com- 
petitors, It is significant to note that, at least with regard to economic suc- 
cess, competing in such a manner produces results that are superior to those 
produced by competitive strategies based on absolute criteria (Frank 1985). 
I have argued elsewhere (Turke 1989) that “demographic transition,” 
the significant reduction in completed family size that occurs with modern- 
ization, may be best understood in terms of what here has been referred to 
as competition within reference groups. In a proximate sense, demographic 
transition is caused primarily by a decline in total fertility. The magnitude 
of this decline is illustrated in a study by Campbell and Wood (1987), which 
indicates that average total fertility is 6.2 in pretransition societies (n = 70) 
and 2.6 in posttransition societies (n = 70). Of course, mortality also declines 
during and after demographic transition, but, as evidenced by recent pop- 
ulation growth rates, the mortality differential between pre- and posttran- 
sition societies usually has not been large enough to offset this differential 
since around the end of World War II. Therefore, on average, individuals 
in most pretransition societies are currently producing more surviving chil- 
dren than individuals in posttransition societies. 
People in pretransition societies are generally poorer, by most economic 
measures, than people in posttransition societies, which implies that in such 
a comparison wealth and inclusive fitness are inversely related. However, 
I have demonstrated that kinship networks constitute an important source 
of wealth for child rearing, and that in this respect pretransition societies 
are wealthier than posttransition societies (Turke 1989). Thus, it may be that 
wealth and inclusive fitness are positively related after all. The next question 
raised, though, is why have people in some societies opted for modes of 
behavior that result in the breakdown of kinship networks and hence in the 
loss of a crucial reproductive resource? The answer, I have argued (Turke 
1989), involves competition within reference groups, and may or may not 
produce an adaptive outcome. 
A hypothesis accounting for a maladaptive (off-track) outcome has the 
following components. Throughout human evolutionary history individuals 
have been able to conceive more children than they can successfully rear. 
As a result, individuals have evolved both to limit births and to strive to 
acquire as many resources as possible. However, some kinds of resources 
are acquired less by individual initiative than other kinds of resources. Spe- 
cifically, it may be that one automatically has been a member of a functional 
extended kinship network more than one automatically has been an effective 
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hunter, for example. Thus, individuals are expected to have evolved to be 
most preoccupied with the acquisition of resources that require individual 
initiative. For reasons that are as yet incompletely understood (see, e.g., 
Handwerker 1986; Turke 1989), it became increasingly efficient in some 
environments to acquire material resources in a manner that contributed to 
the breakdown of extended kinship networks. Thus, while many material 
resources became more abundant, other kinds of more personal resources, 
resources that once were provided by emotionally committed close kin, be- 
came increasingly scarce. Of course, although young children in all societies 
require material resources, even in technologically advanced societies they 
require a much greater abundance of personal services, including affection, 
training, and supervision. 
The above changes, which may be flagged by the term “moderniza- 
tion,” occurred first in some areas of Europe, but were soon exported to 
much of the rest of the world. In any event, because of the design produced 
by past selection pressures, one may hypothesize that individuals pursued, 
and continue to pursue modern modes of livelihood even though, as a result, 
personal resources that were once supplied in abundance by kin eventually 
became so diminished that fewer children can be reared than would be the 
case if less effort was devoted to economic success and more effort was 
devoted to preserving kinship networks (see Turke 1989 for details and dis- 
cussion of additional ways in which diminished kinship networks led to a 
decrease in demand for children). 
On the other hand, under some conditions the foregoing hypothesis can 
be modified to imply that Europeans (and later others) were, and are be- 
having adaptively by adopting resource aquisition strategies (ways of earning 
a living) that result in the breakdown of kinship networks and in fewer chil- 
dren. Specifically, escalating social competition, which for still obscure rea- 
sons began in Europe and was later exported, may have required the de- 
velopment and use of a number of strategies synonymous with modern living, 
such as monogamy, nationalism, and capitalism (all three of which are threat- 
ened by the existence of strong kinship networks) (see Alexander 1979; 1987; 
Betzig 1986; Turke 1989). In this milieu, it is possible that producing a rela- 
tively small number of children maximizes inclusive fitness. Were this true, 
it would be no more surprising than to find, for example, that birds living 
in a relatively inhospitable environment lay fewer eggs and fledge fewer 
offspring than conspecifics in a more hospitable environment. 
All relatively slowly reproducing organisms are of course decended from 
organisms that reproduced more rapidly (at least if descent is traced far 
enough), and I believe it likely that in many instances this kind of progression 
(no normative implication intended) may have resulted from subgroups in 
the less hospitable areas of the species range evolving strategies that con- 
centrate investment in fewer offspring. In turn, if parents who are in the 
habit of concentrating investment in fewer offspring maintain this habit when 
they come into contact with more hospitable environments, their offspring 
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may often have a (socioeconomic and ultimately reproductive) competitive 
advantage over the offspring of parents who invest less in more offspring. 
In this manner an inflationary cycle of investing more in fewer offspring 
could be exported. Human demographic transition may represent a largely 
(or competely) faculative continuance of this progression. In contrast, the 
first demographic transition, the one associated with the advent of agricul- 
ture and an increase in fertility, may represent a change in the opposite 
direction. 
DISCUSSION 
Kitcher (1985) argues that evolutionary studies of human kinship have done 
little to advance our understanding other than to refute some very “odd 
remarks” by anthropologists claiming that genetic relationship has little to 
do with human kinship. He argues similarly for many other topics. One 
could, I think, make the case that evolutionary studies of kinship have done 
more than Kitcher suggests (see, e.g. Chagnon 1982; 1988; Hughes 1988). 
However, even the refutation of a few “odd remarks” is of great importance, 
given that prominent anthropologists can make such remarks only because 
their views of human nature are so much at odds with an evolutionarily 
informed view. 
The same argument applies, I think, to a more recent remark, which is 
every bit as odd as the claim that genetic relationship has little to do with 
human kinship: “There is no more reason to expect high-status people to 
outreproduce low status people than there is to expect, say, heavy tobacco 
use to promote fitness” (Symons 1987b, p. 208). To the contrary, in the 
absence of well developed counter arguments, Darwinian theory provides 
about as much basis for expecting individuals of high status to outreproduce 
individuals of low status as it does for expecting individuals to favor close 
genetic kin (e.g., Daly and Wilson 1988), specific types of content to effect 
the Wason selection task in specific ways (Cosmides 1985>, females to prefer 
males of high status (e.g., Symons 1979; Buss 1989), rapes to be committed 
primarily by disenfranchised males (Thornhill and Thornhill 1983), and etc.” 
Hypotheses of the type criticized by Kitcher generally have sought, as 
a test, to determine whether current behavior is adaptive. Symons and others 
have taken-up Kitcher’s line of argument at this juncture in arguing that 
” Unlike for heavy tobacco use, we can reasonably expect wealth, status, and fitness to cor- 
relate because it is clear that at least some components of fitness have been, and still are, limited 
by access to resources, and because in human societies wealth and status have provided, and 
can still provide, access to the kinds of resources which promote fitness (e.g., food, mates, and 
safe haven). Similarly we can reasonably expect genetic relationship to affect human kinship 
systems and quality of interaction among kin-in ways which have been and are adaptive, 
because kin share genes, and because kin have interacted, and continue to interact, in ways 
which give opportunity for phenotypic altruism. Moreover, neither of the above expectations 
is refuted, or even much weakened, by the mere recognition of potential confounds (e.g., social 
welfare, on the one hand, and much increased interaction with nonkin, on the other). 
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demonstrating that behavior is adaptive does not help to distinguish between 
alternative views of human nature. Here I have defended the point that 
hypotheses about adaptations are likely to be correct if they correctly predict 
an adaptive outcome, and therefore assessing current adaptiveness can con- 
tribute to an understanding of adaptations. A recent paper by Turke and 
Betzig (1985) provides an appropriate example, especially in that it has been 
characterized as being unconcerned with psychological mechanisms and 
therefore failing to contribute to our understanding of human nature (Symons 
1989). In that paper, we analysed the relationship between wealth, status, 
and reproductive success (and some of its components) on Ifaluk, a tradi- 
tional Micronesian atoll society. However, far from being unconcerned with 
psychological mechanisms, our main purpose was to present evidence that 
turned out to go against theoretical constructs of the human psyche that 
deem it likely that learning and culture will lead human behavior off-track 
with respect to adaptiveness. 
[T]he proximate mechanisms that kept cultural behavior adaptive initially 
might have kept it adaptive subsequently (Flinn and Alexander 1982; Turke 
1984) . . . This is not, however, the say that human behavior [today] must 
be adaptive. There are potentially valid theories predicting the decoupling 
of culture from natural selection: natural selection may usually operate too 
slowly to have checked the development of major nonadaptive trends (even 
though it apparently did not do so for thousands or millions of years while 
the capacity for culture was evolving); and cultural evoluation may have 
been significantly molded by selection of replicators other than genes, such 
as ideas or “memes” (Dawkins 1976; Durham 1976; 1982; Richerson and 
Boyd 1978; Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; and others). The crux here, 
however, is that neither of these modes of cultural evolution predicts that 
humans historically or currently strive to maximize genetic representation 
in future generations (Alexander 1979; Turke 1984) (Turke and Betzig 1985, 
pp. 85-86). 
The present paper, however, goes beyond Turke and Betzig (1983, in 
so much as it discusses tests of increasingly detailed theoretical constructs 
of the human psyche. For example, determining that polyandrous marriage 
is carried out adaptively in a present-day contexts suggests that social and 
cultural problems, which are not uniquely related to Pleistocene hunting and 
gathering, and which continually introduce novelty, constituted primary se- 
lective pressures in the evolution of the human psyche; in turn, support is 
given to hypotheses which view the psyche as more general purpose (in the 
sense of being designed to deal with types of novelty) than has been implied 
by some evolutionary psychologists. This view of the psyche as relatively 
general purpose is consistent with similar conclusions being drawn about 
the mental apparatus of much simpler organisms (see West Eberhard 1987). 
With regard specifically to the question of which humans behave adap- 
tively, the available evidence suggests that individuals living in traditional 
societies, that is, societies in which social organization is based primarily 
on kinship, behave adaptively (in the sense of the definition outlined at the 
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beginning of the paper). The evidence is much more equivocal for more 
developed societies, although refinements in both theory and methods prom- 
ise to yield firmer conclusions. For now, it is necessary to continue to con- 
sider a range of hypotheses about the nature of the human psyche. We cannot 
assume that human behavior is off-track, and in turn we cannot assume that 
the cause of our being off-track (if we are) is an evolved design for over- 
coming specific problems that are in some crucial respect unique to hunting 
and gathering in Pleistocene. 
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